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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
COMES NOW the above named appellant, Darin Bergeman, by and through his 
counsel ofrecord, Robert K. Beck of Robert K. Beck & Associates, P.C. and hereby files 
his memorandum in reply to the briefs as filed by the respondents, Select Portfolio 
Servicing (hereafter referred to as "SPS") and Mohamed Elabed (hereafter referred to as 
"Mr. Elabed"), as filed herein. 
INTRODUCTION 
The briefs as submitted by the above respondents contain many misleading 
statements of fact, law, issues and conclusions that strongly suggest the above mentioned 
respondents are very confused about the actual standard of review that a court should 
employ when any named defendant is seeking to dismiss a case pursuant to a Rule 12 (b) 
(6) motion. In addressing this problem in this reply brief, the appellant will attempt to 
address some of the confusing and incoherent arguments of opposing counsel. Needless 
to say, there is not enough time and man power to address all of the arguments that the 
respondents have made in this reply memorandum. Regardless of limited time, this 
memorandum will attempt to focus on what may be the more relevant arguments 
(although misleading) as may be utilized by the respondents -- many of which are 
incoherent and incomprehensible. 
As a result of the success of these respondents in persuading the district court to 
dismiss this case (by virtue of utilizing the wrong standard of review), it would appear 
that the above respondents are suggesting that they should be awarded attorney fees and 
costs on appeal. In light of the district court's failure to employ the correct standard of 
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review and the respondents' willingness to further misstate the facts, issues and law 
surrounding the district court's erroneous decision, it would appear that these respondents 
are fairly certain they will be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Hopefully, this Court will agree that the standard of review is correctly stated in 
the appellant's opening brief. Prior to discussing this standard and suggesting to this 
Court the correct application of the standard, the appellant will note that SPS has 
submitted a brief containing 26 pages and that Mr. Elabed has submitted a brief 
containing 20 pages. In these briefs, the respondents discuss many issues ( and remedies) 
that might be reviewed by a district court in the event of an actual trial where the parties 
present evidence pursuant to the rules that may apply for submitting this ~vidence. This 
reply brief will not address any issues as may be presented in the brief of the respondents 
herein when it requires significant research and effort in employing a standard of review 
that should be clearly utilized in a summary judgment motion or in an appropriate 
deliberation of facts and evidence as presented in a jury trial. 
As admitted by the respondents herein, the District Court has dismissed this case 
as a result of their Rule 12 (b) (6) motion. Although these defendants (and the district 
court) demonstrate a willingness to employ the incorrect standard of review (for whatever 
reason), this brief will not discuss cases or law when the arguments surrounding those as 
mostly presented in the 46 pages of briefing (as noted above) are merely an attempt to 
mislead this Court and waste the appellant's time herein. 
Having stated the above concerns, the appellant would hope that this Court is well 
aware of the appropriate standard of review and the simple application thereof. Part of 
the concern of the appellant herein is the many misstatements as contained in the 
respondents' briefs, mostly which boil down to the wrongful conclusions of these 
2 
respondents in which they misstate that the appellant has not cited to any authority in 
support of his legal conclusions as contained in his initial brief. 
When this Court actually realizes that these respondents herein have expended 
hours and hours of toiling (in district court and other efforts) to present 46 pages of 
briefing to misstate the correct standard of review, the appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court attempt to understand what might be perceived as a lack of effort on the part of 
the appellant herein, rather than a willingness to pursue the pertinent facts, issues and law 
of this case. 
In other words, it may appear that the appellant is playing a game of football and 
the respondents are playing a game of soccer. Regardless of the meaningful time and 
effort spent by this Court in an attempt to resolve the legal disputes of the parties herein, 
the appellant concludes that he has adequately discussed what he reasonably concludes to 
be the correct issues and standard of review as presented in his initial brief. Therefore, 
this reply brief will not reiterate the issues or the standard of review as stated in the 
appellant's initial brief. The appellant will attempt to address the most basic arguments 
as are misstated in the respondents' briefs and point out the specific fallacies related to 
these arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
It appears that these respondents have stated the correct standard of review for a 
motion to dismiss in their briefs. However, they wrongfully apply this standard when 
they allege that the appellant has waived his assignments of error as committed by the 
district court and the respondents by virtue of failing to submit appropriate legal authority 
or argument. In support of these allegations, the respondents ignore the appellant' s 
meaningful discussion of how the court committed error in failing to recognize that the 
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appellant/plaintiff had adequately and specifically plead facts in his second amended 
complaint. They ignore the facts as plead in light of the standard of review requiring the 
District Court to conclude that any payment (or payments) that were made to SPS by 
virtue of the direction and demand of SPS in the amount of $16,000.00 (or for that 
matter, $19,477.87 paid later). These payments were made by virtue of representations 
made by the employees of SPS. The specific arguments in the appellant's opening brief 
clearly conclude that the district court became so excited when it concluded that there 
was no misrepresentation on the part of Mr. Elabed that it totally ignored the facts as 
stated in the complaint surrounding the misrepresentation and mismanagement by SPS 
and of its employees. In addition, Mr. Elabed's attorney made many statements in 
various hearings that were incorporated into the amended complaint, and if construed as 
true, should not have been ignored by the district court. 
Regardless of what may have been Mr. Elabed ' s dispute regarding his lack of 
collusion with SPS and his effort to misrepresent a meaningful payment of $16,000.00 
(or $19,477.87) which this Cowt must now assume to be true, it is clear that the district 
court mis-applied the correct standard of review by dismissing the provisions in the 
complaint with respect to Mr. Elabed. The amended complaint alleges many facts that 
the district court clearly construes against the appellant with respect to both respondents. 
It is clear that the respondents understood some of the specific facts as plead in 
the complaint. However, they intentionally ignore the facts that are stated in the 
complaint as follows: 
16. When the plaintiff herein has made attempts to discuss curing 
the above alleged default of mortgage payments, the defendants have 
employed numerous tactics, excuses and misrepresentations in an 
intentional effort to proceed with the above mentioned foreclosure and issue 
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a bogus trustee's deed to co-defendant Mohamed Elabed. These tactics and 
excuses include, but are not limited to, the following acts: 
a. Refusing to discuss the current status of the mortgage foreclosure with 
anyone other than the executor of the estate of Karen Hansen even 
though the executor' s deed had been issued to the plaintiff herein. 
b. Refusing to discuss the current status of the mortgage foreclosure even 
when provided a copy of the abovementioned power of attorney 
designating Jerry Bergman as an appropriate agent for the plaintiff 
herein. 
c. Indicating, after numerous phone calls from Jerry Bergeman, that the 
defendants would accept a certain payment, including penalties and 
interest, from the plaintiff -- then refusing to accept a payment in the 
approximate amount of $16,000.00 that was wired transferred to the 
defendants prior to the wrongful non-judicial foreclosure and sale 
conducted on February 23, 2017 in the Bonneville County Courthouse. 
d. Ignoring efforts by plaintiff's attorney to discuss the above payment and 
allowing the non-judicial foreclosure to proceed in spite of 
misrepresentations made by the defendants that the sale would be 
vacated. 
e. Continuing to send mortgage statements to the plaintiff (and addressed 
to the Estate of Karen Hansen) in which the defendants made 
misrepresentations that in the event the plaintiff made a mortgage 
payment, that the non-judicial foreclosure sale could and would be 
vacated, regardless of the sale held at the Bonneville County Courthouse 
on or about February 23, 2017. 
f. Accepting a payment from the plaintiff in the amount of $19,422.87.00 
and further admitting that the non-judicial foreclosure sale was vacated 
and invalidated by virtue of numerous payments made to the defendants 
herein. 
g. Holding conversations with co-defendant, Mohamed Elabed, in which 
the defendants have mislead Mr. Elabed and attempted to misrepresent 
that the non-judicial foreclosure sale held on or about February 23, 2017 
is valid. 
h. Failing to admit to co-defendant, Mohamed Elabed, that these 
defendants did in fact receive a meaningful payment prior to the non-
judicial foreclosure sale on or about February 23, 2017 and further 
refusing to admit that these defendants have received other payments 
from the plaintiff herein. 
1. Attempting to conspire, control and coerce co-defendant, Mohamed 
Elabed, into believing that he has made a valid purchase of real estate 
through a bogus non-judicial foreclosure sale. 
It is clear that the respondents can easily ignore the above facts when they merely 
state that the appellant's "opening brief is a general attack on the district court's findings . 
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. . and nothing more." They can also ignore the above facts when they incorrectly state 
that the appellant cites no authority in support of the allegations made in the complaint. 
It is easy to state that the appellant cites to no authority when these respondents misstate 
the facts as specifically plead in the complaint. 
Although the appellant is still somewhat discouraged that the district court would 
attempt to ignore the clear and compelling statements of the appellant herein, these 
respondents are deeply involved in an effort to misrepresent the correct application of the 
standard of review for a motion to dismiss. It would appear that the defendants are 
admitting that Idaho is a state in which the courts have upheld the idea of "notice 
pleading" when they cite to case law that suggests that a plaintiff is not required to prove 
in his complaint that he will ultimately prevail, but that he be able to produce evidence to 
support the claims specifically alleged in the complaint at the time of a trial. Orthman 
v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960. 
So how is a Court able to promote the notion that it will willingly allow notice 
pleadings and then dismiss a complaint when it is compelled to consider the above 
statements of the amended complaint of the appellant herein in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff unless it misapplies the standard ofreview as the district court did in this 
case? Practically, the only way that a case can be realistically dismissed on a Rule 12 (b) 
(6) motion is to ignore the correct standard of review (and lie about it) as the 
respondents have done herein. 
This problem is further illustrated by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff/appellant 
herein filed a motion to strike the statements as made by SPS in its brief (and affidavits) 
supporting the motion to dismiss. This Court will note that this issue is partially 
discussed on page seven of his opening brief: 
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THE COURT: Let's deal with the motion to strike ... The 
statements made in those pleadings ... . this is a 12 (b) (6) motion. We're 
going to deal with the facts that are in the pleadings, not that have 
been filed in addition to those. 
* * * * 
So under Rule 12 ( d) it talks about if on a motion under Rule 12 
(b) [(]6[)] matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment. 
It talks about if I allow that, then I have to give reasonable 
opportunity to present all the information that is pertinent to the 
motions. 
Based upon that, the Court is going to exclude those statements, 
just because they' re not relevant to a 12 (b) (6) motion. The fact that 
there was allegedly some funds that were submitted later, for a 12 (b) 
(6) motion, it, frankly, doesn't matter. So the Court is going to exclude 
those. (Hearing Transcript- May 18, 2017 - page 6, lines 4-24) [emphasis 
added]. 
In light of the attempt by these defendants to handcuff the appellant herein by 
virtue applying some inconsistent standard of review ( and their willingness to ignore the 
plaintiffs motion to strike any evidence other than the evidence submitted in the 
pleadings), let us examine how the correct standard should be applied herein. 
There are two problems with the statements of the above district court. The first 
problem is to determine what was in the pleadings that was submitted by the parties. 
The pleadings that were submitted are those contained in the second amended complaint 
and the briefs supporting the motions to dismiss. Anything that may have been stated in 
the briefs of SPS and Mr. El abed ( other than affidavits submitted in support of said 
motions) should be ignored in a motion to dismiss if the district court followed the 
appropriate rule which it partially admits it should do above. Regardless, in applying this 
rule the district court demonstrates a willingness to ignore the above rule when it states 
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that it will ignore facts (as submitted in the amended complaint - and properly before the 
court) suggesting that it would ignore another payment made to SPS in the amount of 
$19,422.87.00. When the defendants/respondents suggest that the district court's ruling 
should be upheld on appeal and that they should be granted attorney fees as a result of the 
appeal, it appears that they are saying that any and all appellants should be assessed 
attorney fees whenever the district court makes any mistake and any appeal is taken. 
The second problem is very alarming when this Court looks at the briefs of 
opposing counsel and observes that SPS is making all sorts of allegations about the 
money paid ( or not paid to SPS) prior to the initiation of non-judicial foreclosure 
proceedings. If the district court considers matters as may be contained in an affidavit in 
support of a motion to dismiss (as may be submitted by the defendant/respondents 
herein), it would appear that such affidavit would convert the motion to dismiss into a 
summary judgment motion and suggests utilizing a somewhat different standard of 
review. Regardless of the district court's willingness to ignore its own apparent 
instruction to itself regarding statements outside the pleadings, it certainly demonstrated a 
willingness to ignore its own instructions to itself when it states as follows: 
... Plaintiff has failed to allege that a recognized legal duty existed 
between himself, Defendant SPS and/or Defendant Elabed as required. 
Not only was there no duty alleged, but Plaintiff admits that he did not 
assume the mortgage of Karen Hansen after her death. Defendant has also 
failed to allege that the tortious acts of the defendants were foreseeable by 
a third party or the other named defendants .. . (District Court Opinion 
and Order ... Motion to Dismiss - pages 4-5). 
In light of this Court's willingness to hear cases on appeal when mistakes are 
made by a district court, it would appear that the court in this case is unable to follow its 
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own directives to itself when it says it will ignore facts other than those as submitted in 
the pleadings. 
This appellant was considering filing a motion to strike portions of the 
respondents briefs as a result of many statements that are inaccurate and prejudicial. This 
appellant determined that it would not pursue this attempt to clarify the issue at this level 
because the appellant already filed a motion to strike at the trial level. The appellant is 
thankful that Mr. Elabed has assisted in this effort by virtue of filing his objection to the 
clerks record on appeal in which it is apparent that we now have preserved a record of the 
plaintiffs motion to strike. 
Generally, civil courts are hesitant to grant a motion to dismiss as these district 
courts know that they will not be upheld on appeal. It would appear that the summary 
judgment standard of review ( although a little more complex) allows a district court to 
make some effort to weigh facts that are inconsistent or glaring. Most district courts 
know that they can easily dismiss a case on a motion for summary judgement when they 
allow the case to proceed and the plaintiff is unable to produce or find any evidence to 
support his claims. 
Certainly, it would appear that the district court was impatient in this case as there 
were plenty of specific facts as plead that would either lead to a point where these 
defendants/respondents could martial evidence that would support their misstatements 
rather than concluding that their misstatements were true ( or false as the district court has 
done in this case). It is rather difficult to conclude that these defendants have made any 
appropriate legal arguments that would support their case other than their glaring 
misstatements (as supported by the district court). 
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It is interesting to note that these defendants are relying on the notion that this 
district court was correct in suggesting that the appellant had no basis to timely reconcile 
with SPS by virtue of his efforts to pay off the note or to bring it current. Part of this 
argument suggests that the district court could wrongfully assume that it could ignore the 
specific provisions in the deed of trust ( allowing reconciliation) as a result of the 
appellant's admitted failure to enter into an assumption agreement with SPS although he 
made extensive payments to SPS which were accepted for numerous years. 
Although these respondents ignore the well made point that there is no citation 
to any authority that would allow the district court to ignore the correct application of the 
standard of review - the respondents attempt to mislead this Court by virtue of their 
allegation that the appellant has failed to cite any authority based on their incorrect 
interpretation of the district court's wrongful decision. 
Had the district court allowed this case to go forward, it would have been 
subjected to reviewing a motion for summary judgment in which it would have reviewed 
depositions taken by the plaintiff in which SPS admitted a willingness to accept a 
$16,000.00 payment and vacate the mortgage foreclosure. In addition, had the district 
court been willing, it would also be able to review further deposition statements that 
show admissions of SPS in which it accepted and never returned a payment in the 
amount of $19,422.87.00 and is now attempting to keep this money by virtue of these 
court proceedings in which the district court has committed error. 
It seems that the action of these defendants/respondents is somehow bordering on 
fraudulent when it would appear that SPS has an additional $19,422.87 .00 of the 
plaintiffs money and has dismissed this case with the assistance of the district court. It is 
easy to understand why the appellant is so irritated by the actions of these defendants as it 
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appears that they have colluded between themselves and sold the plaintiffs property 
through a bogus non-judicial foreclosure sale in which they, in open court, utilize some 
vague notion or argument of confidentiality to persuade the district court to rule in 
their favor. 
Regardless of the efforts of the district court and the respondents herein to engage 
in what may be a successful effort to dismiss this case, it would appear that these 
opposing parties were trying to avoid further problems by making what appeared to be 
persuasive but wrongful arguments (when considering the appropriate standard of 
review). The actions of these defendants suggest that they have engaged in numerous acts 
that would support a motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. 
As we all know, a plaintiff here in Idaho must avoid the initial filing of a complaint 
stating a cause of action for punitive damages in civil cases. He must first obtain specific 
evidence that would support the claim by virtue of taking depositions, obtaining expert 
opinions and obtaining answers to written discovery. Then the plaintiff can file his action 
for punitive damages by filing a motion to amend the complaint. 
It appears that the district court and the defendants herein are not aware of this 
rule regarding punitive damages as they are definitely arguing a different standard of 
review that is admittedly utilized in a trial setting where the district court must weigh 
evidence and determine whether the plaintiff has submitted evidence to the jury at trial 
rather than admit that any allegations as may be mentioned in the case are reasonable. 
Why admit that allegations may be reasonable when you can get the judge to buy into an 
argument that should be made a trial. 
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The plaintiff/appellant is unaware of any cases in Idaho that would support the 
notion that the district court must weigh evidence as it has done at the hearing on the 
motion dismiss as filed by the respondents herein. 
The other problem as discussed in Mr. Elabed's motion to dismiss is the issue of 
applying a remedy at the point of a motion to dismiss when the district court ( or a jury) 
must weigh any and all evidence at a trial. Mr. Elabed's suggestion that this case must 
be dismissed because the plaintiff had three shots to amend his complaint (which failed 
by virtue of the district court's wrongful ruling) are ridiculous in light of the fact that the 
district court must review the evidence at the trial in order to determine if the plaintiff 
has met his burden of proof and if there is an appropriate remedy. It would appear that 
the district court has forgotten its obligation to wait and allow appropriate discovery (and 
perhaps allow the trial to happen) prior to ruling on a motion to dismiss. 
Any and all arguments against the motion to consolidate are likewise 
unpersuasive since we can easily conclude that the district court would have granted the 
motion to consolidate had it denied the motion to dismiss. The respondents appear to 
suggest that the district court was correct in granting the motion to consolidate because 
the appellant has failed to show that there was an abuse of discretion. It is easy to argue 
irrelevant issues when the district court is so easily persuaded to grant a poorly conceived 
motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
It is easy for this Court to conclude that the district court has committed error and 
that this case should be reversed and sent to a different judge. The appellant could spend 
hours and hours in submitting a 46 page brief that would maybe discuss all the irrelevant 
issues of this case. Rather than make this appeal more complex, it appears that the 
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district court committed error as encouraged by these respondents. Yes, it appears that 
the appellant is playing a game of football and that these respondents are playing a game 
of soccer. However, it would appear that this Court would agree that we are 
(figuratively) playing a game of football - at least if we agree that the standard of review 
is as partially admitted by the defendants and the district court in its decision 
(although full of many errors). 
DATED this ~y ofJune, 2018. 
Robert K. Beck 
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